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The paper presents the proof-theoretical approach to a probabilistic logic which allows expressions about (approxi-
mate) conditional probabilities. The logic enriches propositional calculus with probabilistic operators which are applied
to propositional formulas: CPPsða; bÞ, CP6s(a,b) and CPsða; bÞ, with the intended meaning ‘‘the conditional probability
of a given b is at least s’’, ‘‘at most s’’ and ‘‘approximately s’’, respectively. Possible-world semantics with a ﬁnitely additive
probability measure on sets of worlds is deﬁned and the corresponding strong completeness theorem is proved for a rather
simple set of axioms. This is achieved at the price of allowing inﬁnitary rules of inference. One of these rules enables us to
syntactically deﬁne the range of the probability function. This range is chosen to be the unit interval of a recursive non-
archimedean ﬁeld, making it possible to express statements about approximate probabilities. Formulas of the form
CP1(a,b) may be used to model defaults. The decidability of the logic is proved.
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The problem of reasoning with uncertain knowledge is an ancient problem dating, at least, from Leibnitz
and Boole. In the last decades an approach was developed, connected with computer science and artiﬁcial
intelligence, which starts with propositional calculus and adds ‘‘probability operators’’ that behave like modal
operators. Consequently, the semantics consists in special types of Kripke models (possible worlds) with addi-
tion of ﬁnitely additive probability measures deﬁned over the worlds [8,9,23] (see also [26] for a more complete
list of references). One of the main proof-theoretical problems with that approach is providing an axiom sys-
tem which would be strongly complete (‘‘every consistent set of formulas has a model’’, in contrast to the weak0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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such systems. Namely, in such languages it is possible to deﬁne an inconsistent inﬁnite set of formulas, every
ﬁnite subset of which is consistent (e.g., f:P¼0ag [ fP<1=na : n is a positive integerg). As it was pointed in
[25,32], there is an unpleasant consequence of ﬁnitary axiomatization in that case: there exist unsatisﬁable sets
of formulas that are consistent with respect to the assumed ﬁnite axiomatic system (since all ﬁnite subsets are
consistent and deductions are ﬁnite sequences).
Building on our previous work [7,22,24,25,27], we deﬁne a system using inﬁnitary rules of inference (i.e.,
rules where a conclusion has a countable set of premises). Thus, all formulas, axioms and theorems are ﬁnite,
but the proofs might be countably inﬁnite. We introduce an inﬁnitary rule which enables us to syntactically
deﬁne the range of the probability function which will appear in the interpretation. We choose here this range
to be the unit interval of a recursive non-archimedean ﬁeld containing all rational numbers (an example of
such ﬁeld would be the Hardy ﬁeld Q[], where  is an inﬁnitesimal). A similar rule was given in [2] but
restricted to rationals only. We show that our system is sound, strongly complete and decidable. In this paper
we introduce the conditional probability operators: CPPsða; bÞ and CP6sða; bÞ with the intended meaning ‘‘the
conditional probability of a given b is at least s’’, and ‘‘at most s’’, respectively. Note that the usual probability
operators of the form PPsa (‘‘the probability of a is at least s’’) are obtained as a special case of the conditional
probability operators, namely PPsa ¼ CPPsða;>Þ, where > is any tautology. Since we specify, already in the
syntax, that the range of probability is non-archimedean, it is possible also to introduce the conditional prob-
ability operators CPrða; bÞ with the intended meaning ‘‘the conditional probability of a given b is approxi-
mately r’’, and in that way represent approximate probabilistic knowledge. It turns out that formulas of
the form CP1ða; bÞ which can be read as ‘‘the probabilities of a ^ b and b are almost the same’’ may be used
to model defaults. We show that, if we restrict attention only to formulas of this type, the resulting system
coincides with the system P of [18] when we work only with the ﬁnite sets of assumptions. If we allow inference
from an inﬁnite set of ‘‘defaults’’ our system is somewhat stronger. The main advantage, however, is that we
can use the full logic to represent probabilistic and approximate knowledge and thus express explicitly prop-
erties that cannot be formulated in the language of defaults. This logic also makes it possible to discuss ‘‘con-
ditioning on the events of zero probability’’. Namely, if the probability of a ^ b is  and probability of b is 2,
the conditional probability of a given b will be 1
2
. In the absence of inﬁnitesimals and following the approach
based on Kolmogorov’s ideas, the probabilities of a ^ b and b would be 0, so the conditional probability
would be either not deﬁned, or 1. In this paper, the later case is used to resolve the problem of indeterminacy
of conditional probability when the condition has the probability 0. Note that coherence-based probabilistic
logics also avoid this problem [5,6,13].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 syntax of the logic is given. Section 3 describes the
class LPPSMeas;Neat of neat measurable models, while in Section 4 a corresponding sound and complete axiomatic
system is introduced. A proof of the completeness theorem is presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains a proof
of decidability. In Section 7 we describe how our system can be used to model default reasoning and analyze
some properties of the corresponding default consequence relation. We conclude in Section 8.
2. Syntax
Let S be the unit interval of the Hardy ﬁeld Q[]. Q[] is a recursive non-archimedean ﬁeld which contains
all rational functions of a ﬁxed positive inﬁnitesimal  which belongs to a non-standard elementary extension
*R of the standard real numbers [16,30]. An element  of *R is an inﬁnitesimal if jj < 1n for every natural num-
ber n. Q[] contains all rational numbers. Let Q[0,1] denote the set of rational numbers from [0,1].
The language of the logic consists of: a denumerable set Var = {p,q, r, . . .} of propositional letters, the clas-
sical connectives :, and ^, and binary probabilistic operators (CP6s)s2S, (CPPs)s2S, and (CPr)r2Q[0, 1]. The
set ForC of classical propositional formulas is deﬁned as usual. Elements of ForC will be denoted by a,b, . . .
The set ForSP of probabilistic propositional formulas is the smallest set Y containing all formulas of the forms:
• CPPsða; bÞ for a; b 2 ForC, s 2 S,
• CP6sða; bÞ for a; b 2 ForC, s 2 S and
• CPrða; bÞ for a; b 2 ForC, r 2 Q[0,1],
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(A ^ B) is in Y. Formulas from ForSP will be denoted by A,B, . . . Let ForS ¼ ForC [ ForSP . u, w, . . . will be used
to denote formulas from the set ForS. Note that neither mixing of pure propositional formulas and probability
formulas, nor nested probabilistic operators are allowed. For example, a ^ CPPs(a,b) and CP6s(a,CPPr(b,c))
are not well-formed formulas. The other classical connectives (_,!,M) can be deﬁned as usual. For a 2 ForC,
and A 2 ForSP , we abbreviate both :a ^ a and :A ^ A by ?, and :a _ a and :A _ A by >, letting the context
determine the meaning. In the rest of the paper ± A is either A or :A, while:
• CP<s(a,b) denotes :CPPsða; bÞ for a,b 2 ForC, s 2 S,
• CP>s(a,b) denotes :CP6sða; bÞ for a,b 2 ForC, s 2 S,
• CP¼sða; bÞ denotes CPPsða; bÞ ^ CP6sða; bÞ for a;b 2 ForC, s 2 S and
• Pqsa denotes CP qsða;>Þ for a 2 ForC and q 2 fP;6; >;<;¼;g.
It should be noted that CPP and CP6 are not interdeﬁnable since the appropriate equivalence breaks down
when the probability of the condition is 0.3. Semantics
The semantics for ForS will be based on Kripke models.
Deﬁnition 1. An LPPS-model is a structure hW ;H ; l; vi where:
(1) W is a non-empty set of elements called worlds,
(2) H is an algebra of subsets of W,
(3) l : H! S is a ﬁnitely additive probability measure, namely:• for every X 2 H, l(X)P 0,
• l(W) = 1, and
• l(X1 [ X2) = l(X1) + l(X2), for all disjoint sets X1,X2 2 H,(4) v : W  Var ! ftrue; falseg is a valuation which associates with every world w 2W a truth assignment
v(w) on the propositional letters.The valuation v is extended to a truth assignment on all classical propositional formulas in the usual way.
Let M be an LPPS model and a 2 ForC. The set {w : v(w)(a) = true} is denoted by [a]M.
Deﬁnition 2. An LPPS-model M is measurable if [a]M 2 H for every a 2 ForC. An LPPS-model M is neat if
only the empty set has the zero probability. LPPSMeas;Neat denotes the class of all neat and measurable LPP
S-
models.
The neatness condition is introduced in order to make our models a subclass of *R-probabilistic models of
[17,18]. This facilitates the explanation of a possible application of our system to default reasoning (see Section
7). All the results can be also proved for the class of measurable LPPS-models.
Deﬁnition 3. The satisﬁability relation  LPPSMeas;Neat  ForS is deﬁned by the following conditions for every
LPPSMeas;Neat-model M:
(1) if a 2 ForC, M  a if ("w 2W)v (w)(a) = true,
(2) M  CP6sða; bÞ if either l([b]M) = 0 and s = 1 or l([b]M) > 0 and lð½a^bM Þlð½bM Þ 6 s,
(3) M  CPPs(a,b) if either l([b ]M) = 0 or l([b]M) > 0 and lð½a^bM Þlð½bM Þ P s,
(4) M  CPr(a,b) if either l([b]M) = 0 and r = 1 or l([b]M) > 0 and for every positive integer n,
lð½a^bM Þ
lð½bM Þ 2 ½maxf0; r  1=ng;minf1; r þ 1=ng.
(5) if A 2 ForSP , M  :A if M2A,
(6) if A;B 2 ForSP , M  A ^ B if M  A and M  B.
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ever the condition has the probability 0. Also, note that the condition 4 is equivalent to saying that the con-
ditional probability equals r  i (or r + i) for some inﬁnitesimal i 2 S. It is easy to see that the deﬁned
operators will behave as expected, e.g., M  P<sa iﬀ l([a]M) < s.
A formula u 2 ForS is satisﬁable if there is an LPPSMeas;Neat-model M such that M  u; u is valid if for every
LPPSMeas;Neat-modelM,M  u; a set of formulas is satisﬁable if there is an LPPSMeas;Neat-model in which every for-
mula from the set is satisﬁable.
4. Axiomatization
As we shall prove in Section 5, the set of all valid formulas can be characterized by the following set of
axiom schemata:
(1) all ForC-instances of classical propositional tautologies
(2) all ForSP -instances of classical propositional tautologies
(3) CPP0(a,b)
(4) CP6s(a,b)! CP<t(a,b), t > s
(5) CP<s(a,b)! CP6s(a,b)
(6) PP1 (aM b)! (P=sa! P=sb)
(7) P6sa$ PP1s:a
(8) ðP¼sa ^ P¼tb ^ PP1:ða ^ bÞÞ ! P¼minð1;sþtÞða _ bÞ
(9) P=0b! CP=1(a,b)
(10) (P=tb ^ P=s(a ^ b))! CP=s/t(a,b), t5 0
(11) CPrða; bÞ ! CPPr1ða; bÞ, for every rational r1 2 [0, r)
(12) CPrða; bÞ ! CP6r1ða; bÞ, for every rational r1 2 (r, 1]
and inference rules:
(1) From u and u! w infer w.
(2) If a 2 ForC, from a infer PP1a.
(3) From A! P5sa, for every s 2 S, infer A!?.
(4) For every r 2 Q[0, 1], from A! CPPr1=nða; bÞ, for every integer nP 1/r, and A! CP6r+1/ n(a,b) for
every integer nP 1/(1  r), infer A! CPrða; bÞ.
We denote this axiomatic system by AxLPPS . Let us brieﬂy discuss it. Putting b to be >, Axiom 3 says that
every formula is satisﬁed in a set of worlds of the probability at least 0. Axiom 6 means that the equivalent
formulas have the same probability. Axiom 8 ensures the ﬁnite additivity of probability, i.e., if the sets of
worlds that satisfy a and b are disjoint, then the probability of the set of worlds that satisfy a _ b is the
sum of the probabilities of the former two sets. Axiom 9 was added in order to conform with the useful
practice of assuming conditional probability to be 1, whenever the condition has the probability 0. Axiom
10 expresses the standard deﬁnition of conditional probability. The axioms 11 and 12 and Rule 4 describe
the relationship between the standard conditional probability and the conditional probability inﬁnitesimally
close to some rational r 2 Q[0, 1]. From the axioms 3 and 7, and Rule 2 we obtain the inference rule: from
a infer P=1a. The rules 3 and 4 are inﬁnitary. Rule 3 guarantees that the probability of a formula belongs
to the set S.
A formula u is deducible from a set T of formulas (denoted T‘AxLPPS a) if there is an at most denumerable
sequence (called proof) of formulas u0,u1, . . . ,u, such that every ui is an axiom or a formula from the set T, or
it is derived from the preceding formulas by an inference rule. Therefore, the length of a proof can be a count-
able ordinal. Similar approach was given in [15]. A formula u is a theorem (‘u) if it is deducible from the
empty set. A set T of formulas is consistent if there are at least a formula from ForC, and at least a formula
from ForSP that are not deducible from T. A consistent set T of formulas is said to be maximal consistent if the
following holds:
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• for every A 2 ForSP , either A 2 T or :A 2 T .
A set T is deductively closed if for every u 2 ForS, if T ‘ u, then u 2 T.5. Soundness and completeness
Soundness of our system follows from the soundness of propositional classical logic, and from the proper-
ties of probabilistic measures. The arguments are of the usual type presented e.g. in the proof of Theorem 13 in
[22]. In the proof of the completeness theorem the following strategy shall be applied. We start with a form of
the deduction theorem, and some other useful statements. In the next step we show how to extend a consistent
set T of formulas to a maximal consistent set T*. Finally, a canonical LPPSMeas;Neat-model M is constructed out
of the formulas from the set T* such that M  u iﬀ u 2 T*.Theorem 4 (Deduction theorem). If T is a set of formulas and T [ {u} ‘ w, then T ‘ u! w, where either
u;w 2 ForC or u;w 2 ForSP .
Proof. We use the transﬁnite induction on the length of the proof of w from T [ {u}. Let us ﬁrst consider the
case where w = PP1a is obtained from T [ {u} by an application of Rule 2, and u 2 ForSP . However, since
a 2 ForC, and u 2 ForSP , u is not used in the proof of a from T [ {u}, and we have:
T ‘ a,
T ‘ PP1a by Rule 2,
T ‘ PP1 a! (u! PP1a),
T ‘ u! PP1a by Rule 1.
Next, assume that w = A!? is obtained from T [ {u} by an application of Rule 3, and u 2 ForSP . Then:
T,u ‘ A! P5sd, for every s 2 S.
T ‘ u! (A! P5sd), for every s 2 S, by the induction hypothesis.
T ‘ (u ^ A)! P5sd, for every s 2 S.
T ‘ (u ^ A)!?, by Rule 3.
T ‘ u! w.
The case concerning Rule 4 follows similarly, while the case of Rule 1 is treated in the usual way. h
The next theorem is straightforward, and the proof is left to the reader.Theorem 5. Let a; b 2 ForC. Then:
(1) ‘ CPPtða; bÞ ! CPPsða; bÞ, t > s.
(2) ‘ CP6tða; bÞ ! CP6sða; bÞ, t < s.
(3) ‘ CP¼tða; bÞ ! :CP¼sða; bÞ, t5 s.
(4) ‘ CP¼tða; bÞ ! :CPPsða; bÞ, t < s.
(5) ‘ CP¼tða; bÞ ! :CP6sða; bÞ, t > s.
(6) ‘ CP¼rða; bÞ ! CPrða; bÞ, r 2 Q[0,1].
(7) ‘ CPr1ða; bÞ ! :CPr2ða; bÞ, for r1; r2 2 Q½0; 1, r15 r2.
(8) ‘ P¼0b! :CP6sða; bÞ, for s < 1.
(9) ‘P61a.
Note that, by restricting b to >, we obtain analogous statements for unconditional probabilities (except the
statement 5(8), of course).
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Proof. Let T be a consistent set, CnC(T) the set of all classical formulas that are consequences of T, A0,A1, . . .
an enumeration of all formulas from ForSP and a0,a1, . . . an enumeration of all formulas from ForC. We deﬁne a
sequence of sets Ti, i = 0,1,2, . . . such that:
(1) T0 = T [ CnC (T) [ {PP1a : a 2 CnC(T)}
(2) for every iP 0,
(a) if T2i [ {Ai} is consistent, then T2i+1 = T 2i [ {Ai};
(b) otherwise, if T2i [ {Ai} is not consistent, we have:
(i) if Ai is of the form A! CPrða; bÞ, then T 2iþ1 ¼ T 2i [ f:Ai;A! :CPPr1=nða;bÞg, or
T 2iþ1 ¼ T 2i [ f:Ai;A! :CP6rþ1=nða; bÞg, for some integer n, where n is chosen such that T2i+1
is consistent (we prove that this is possible below);
(ii) otherwise, T 2iþ1 ¼ T 2i [ f:Aig,
(3) for every iP 0, T2i+2 = T2i+1 [ {P=sai}, where s is chosen to be an arbitrary element of S such that T2i+2
is consistent (we prove that this is possible below),
(4) for every iP 0, if Ti is enlarged by a formula of the form P=0a, add :a to Ti [ {P=0a} as well.
We can show that every Ti is a consistent set. T0 is consistent because it is a set of consequences of a
consistent set. The sets obtained by the steps 2a and 2b.ii are obviously consistent. Let us consider the step
2b.i. Suppose that Ai is of the form A! CPrða; bÞ, and that T 2i [ fA! CPrða; bÞg is not consistent. Also,
let all the sets T 2i [ f:ðA! CPrða; bÞÞ;A! :CPPr1=nða; bÞg, for every integer n : r  1/nP 0, and
T 2i [ f:ðA! CPrða; bÞÞ;A! :CP6rþ1=nða; bÞg for every n : r + 1/n 6 1 be inconsistent. Then, the following
contradicts consistency of T2i:
(1) T 2i;:ðA! CPrða; bÞÞ; A! :CPPr1=nða; bÞ ‘?, for every integer n,
(2) T 2i;:ðA! CPrða; bÞÞ; A! :CP6rþ1=nða; bÞ ‘?, for every integer n,
(3) T 2i;:ðA! CPrða; bÞÞ ‘ A! CPPr1=nða; bÞ, for every integer n,
(4) T 2i;:ðA! CPrða; bÞÞ ‘ A! CP6rþ1=nða; bÞ, for every integer n,
(5) T 2i;:ðA! CPrða; bÞÞ ‘ A! CPrða; bÞ, by Rule 4.
Consider the step 3 of the construction, and suppose that for every s 2 S, T2i+1 [ {P=sai} is not consistent.
Let T 2iþ1 ¼ T 0 [ Tþ2iþ1, where Tþ2iþ1 denotes the set of all formulas B 2 ForSP that were added to T0 in the
previous steps of the construction. Then the following contradicts consistency of T2i+1:
(1) T 0; Tþ2iþ1; P¼sai ‘?, for every s 2 S, by the hypothesis
(2) T 0; Tþ2iþ1 ‘ :P¼sai, for every s 2 S, by deduction theorem
(3) T 0 ‘ ð
V
B2Tþ
2iþ1
BÞ ! :P¼sai, for every s 2 S, by deduction theorem
(4) T 0 ‘ ð
V
B2Tþ
2iþ1
BÞ !?, by Rule 3
(5) T2i+1 ‘ ?Finally, consider the step 4 of the construction. Suppose that for some a 2 ForC, T i [ fP¼0a;:ag ‘?. By
deduction theorem, we have that Ti [ {P=0a} ‘ a. Since a 2 ForC, a is a consequence of CnC(T), the set of all
classical formulas that are consequences of T, and a 2 CnC(T). Then, by the construction, we have that
PP1a 2 T0 which leads to inconsistency of Ti [ {P=0a} since:
(1) T i; P¼0a ‘ P61a by Theorem 5(9)
(2) Ti,P=0a ‘ PP1a since PP1a 2 T0  Ti
(3) Ti,P=0a ‘ P=1a by deﬁnition of P=1
(4) Ti ‘ P=0a! P=1a by Deduction theorem
(5) T i ‘ P¼0a! :P¼1a by Theorem 5(3)
(6) T i; P¼0a ‘?
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First, note that if P=sa 2 T*, then for every B 2 ForSP , B! P=sa 2 T*. Suppose that it is not the case. Then,
according to the above construction, for some B 2 ForSP , and some j, P=sa and :ðB! P¼saÞ (i.e., B ^ :P¼sa)
belong to Tj. It means that T j ‘ P¼sa ^ :P¼sa, a contradiction. We continue by showing that T* is a
deductively closed set which does not contain all formulas, and, as a consequence, that T* is consistent. Note
that, if a formula a 2 ForC, by the construction of T0, a and :a cannot be simultaneously in T0. For a formula
A 2 ForSP the set T* does not contain both A = Ai and :A ¼ Aj, because Tmax(2i,2j)+1 is consistent.
If a formula a 2 ForC and T* ‘ a, then by the construction of T0, a 2 T* and PP1a 2 T*. Let A 2 ForSP . It can
be proved by the induction on the length of the inference that if T* ‘ A, then A 2 T*. Note that if A = Aj and
Ti ‘ A, it must be A 2 T* because Tmax(i,2j)+1 is consistent. Suppose that the sequence u1,u2, . . . ,A forms the
proof of A from T*. If the sequence is ﬁnite, there must be a set Ti such that Ti ‘ A, and A 2 T*. Thus, suppose
that the sequence is countably inﬁnite. We can show that for every i, if ui is obtained by an application of an
inference rule, and all the premises belong to T*, then it must be ui 2 T*. If the rule is a ﬁnitary one, then
reasoning as above, we conclude ui 2 T*. Next, we consider inﬁnitary rules. Let ui = A! CPr(a,b) be
obtained by Rule 4 from the set of premises of the form A! CPPr1=nða; bÞ, for every integer n : r  1/nP 0
and A! CP6rþ1=nða; bÞ, for every integer n : r + 1/n 6 1. Suppose that ui 62 T*. By the step 2b.i of the
construction, there are some n and j such that A! :CPPr1=nða; bÞ or A! :CP6rþ1=nða; bÞ belongs to Tj. Let
us suppose the former case, while the latter one will follow similarly. It means that there is some l such that
A! CPPr1=nða; bÞ;A! :CPPr1=nða; bÞ 2 T l. Then, Tl ‘ A!?, and Tl ‘ A! CPr(a,b). It follows that
ui 2 T*, a contradiction. The case concerning formulas obtained by Rule 3 can be proved in the same way. h
Being a maximal consistent set, T* has all the expected properties:
Theorem 7. The following holds for every u, w 2 ForS, and all a,b 2 ForC.
(1) T* contains all theorems.
(2) If u 2 T*, then :u 62 T .
(3) u ^ w 2 T* iff u 2 T* and w 2 T*.
(4) If u, u! w 2 T*, then w 2 T*.
(5) There is exactly one s 2 S such that P=s a 2 T*.
(6) There is exactly one s 2 S such that CP=s(a,b) 2 T*.
(7) If CPPsða; bÞ 2 T , there is r 2 S such that rP s and CP=r(a,b) 2 T*.
(8) If CP6sða; bÞ 2 T , there is r 2 S such that r 6 s and CP=r(a,b) 2 T*.
(9) If CPr1ða; bÞ 2 T  and r2 2 Q[0,1]n{r1}, then CPr2ða; bÞ 62 T .
Proof. (1–4) The proof is standard and left to the reader. (8) can be proved in the same way as (7), while (9)
follows from Theorem 5(7).
(5) According to Theorem 5(3), if P=sa 2 T*, then for every r5 s, P=ra 62 T*. On the if for every s 2 S,
:P¼sa 2 T , then T  ‘ :P¼sa for every s 2 S. By Rule 3, T* ‘ ? which contradicts consistency of T*.
(6) Similarly as above, there cannot be two diﬀerent r, s 2 S such that CP=r(a,b) 2 T* and CP¼sða; bÞ 2 T .
For exactly one r and exactly one t, P=rb 2 T* and P=t (a ^ b) 2 T*. If r = 0, then CP=1(a, b) 2 T*, by Axiom 9.
Let r5 0, and s ¼ tr. Using Axiom 10 we have that CP=s(a,b) 2 T*.
(7) Let CPPsa 2 T*. From the above item (6) of this statement, there is exactly one r 2 S such that
CP=r(a,b) 2 T*. It follows from Theorem 5(4) that r cannot be less than s. Thus, it must be rP s. h
Using T*, we can deﬁne a tuple M = hW, {[a]M : a 2 ForC},l,vi, where
• W = {w  CnC(T)} contains all the classical propositional interpretations that satisfy the set CnC(T) of all
classical consequences of the set T,
• [a]M = {w 2W : w  a},
• for w 2W and p 2 Var, v(w)(p) = true iﬀ w  p, and
• l is deﬁned on {[a]M : a 2 ForC} by l([a]M) = s iﬀ P=sa 2 T*.
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Theorem 8. Let M = hW,{[a]M : a 2 ForC},l, vi be defined as above. Then:
(1) l is well-defined, i.e., if [a]M = [b]M, then l([a]M) = l([b]M).
(2) {[a]M : a 2 ForC} is an algebra of subsets of W.
(3) l is a finitely additive probability measure.
(4) for every a 2 ForC, l([a]M) = 0 iff [a]M = ;.Theorem 9 (Extended completeness theorem). A set T of formulas is consistent if and only if T has an
LPPSMeas;Neat-model.
Proof. The (()-direction follows from the soundness of AxLPPS . In order to prove the ())-direction we con-
struct M as above, and show that for every u 2 ForS, Mu iﬀ u 2 T*.
Let u 2 ForC. If u 2 T*, then certainly u 2 CnC(T), and for every w 2W, w  u, i.e.,M  u. IfM  u, then
by the completeness of classical propositional logic u 2 CnC(T), and u 2 T*. The cases u ¼ :A and u = A ^ B
are straightforward and left to the reader.
Let u = CPPs(a,b). Suppose that CPPsða; bÞ 2 T . From Theorem 7(5) there are unique r; t 2 S such that
l([a ^ b]M) = r and l([b]M) = t (i.e., P=r(a ^ b), P=t(b) 2 T*). If t = 0, by Deﬁnition 3, M  CPPsða; bÞ. If
t5 0, by Axiom 10, CP=r/t(a,b) 2 T*. It follows from Theorem 5(4) that rt P s, so M  CPPsða; bÞ. For the
other direction, suppose that M  CPPsða; bÞ. If l([b]M) = 0, we have that P=0(b) 2 T*, and by Axiom 9,
CP=1(a,b) 2 T*. Next, by Theorem 5(1), CPPs (a,b) 2 T*. So, let l([a ^ b]M) = r and l([b]M) = t, t > 0 and
r
t P s. By Axiom 10 it must be CP=r/t(a,b) 2 T*, and again by the monotonicity of the conditional probability,
CPPsða; bÞ 2 T . The case u = CP6s(a,b) follows similarly.
Finally, let u ¼ CPrða; bÞ. Suppose that CPr(a,b) 2 T*. If l(w)([b]) = 0, by Axiom 9 and Theorems 5(6)
and 5(7), it must be r = 1, and M  CP1(a,b). If l(w)([b]) > 0, by Axioms 11 and 12, CPPr0 ða; bÞ,
CP6r00 ða; bÞ 2 T  for all rational numbers r 0, r00 such that 0 6 r 0 < r < r00 6 1. Then, reasoning as above, we have
M  CPPr0 ða; bÞ andM  CP6r00 ða; bÞ, which means thatM  CPr(a,b). For the other direction, suppose that
M  CPr(a,b). Then, for all rational numbers r 0, r00 such that 0 6 r 0 < r < r00 6 1, we have M  CPPr0(a,b)
and M  CP6r00 ða; bÞ. It follows that CPPr0(a,b), CP6r00 ða; bÞ 2 T . If CPr(a,b) 62 T*, the step 2b.i of the
construction of the set T* guarantees that for some rational number r0, either r0 < r and :CPPr0ða; bÞ 2 T  or
r0 > r and :CP6r0ða; bÞ 2 T  which contradicts consistency of T*. Thus, CPr(a,b) 2 T*. h6. Decidability
Since the satisﬁability problem for classical propositional logic is decidable, to prove decidability of our
logic, it is enough to show that the satisﬁability problem for probability formulas is decidable.
We can perform some easy transformations which will reduce the satisﬁability problem to checking prob-
ability formulas of simpler form. Let A be a probability formula and p1, . . . ,pn be the list of all propositional
letters from A. An atom a of A is a formula ±p1 ^ 	 	 	 ± pn. For diﬀerent atoms ai and aj we have ‘ ai ! :aj.
We use At(A) to denote the set of all atoms from A, and n to denote the number of propositional letters from
A. Obviously, jAt(A)j = 2n.
Using propositional reasoning it is easy to show that every probability formula A is equivalent to a for-
mula: DNF ðAÞ ¼ Wmi¼1
Vki
j¼1 
 X i;jðp1; . . . ; pnÞ called a disjunctive normal form of A, where:
• Xi,j 2 {CPPs,CP6s}s2S [ {CPr}r2Q[0, 1],
• X i;jðp1; . . . ; pnÞ denotes that the propositional formula which is in the scope of the probability operator Xi,j
is in the complete disjunctive normal form, i.e. the propositional formula is a disjunction of the atoms of A.
Obviously, to prove decidability of our logic, it is enough to show that satisﬁability of probability formulas
of the form
Vk
i¼1 
 X iðp1; . . . ; pnÞ is decidable.
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CPPsða; bÞ, 
CP6sða; bÞ, and ±CPr(a,b)) we can distinguish
two cases:
(1) the probability of b is zero, in which case
• CPPsða; bÞ, for s 2 S, :CP6sða; bÞ, for s 2 Sn{1}, CP61(a,b), and CP1(a,b) hold – and can be deleted
from the formula, while
• :CPPsða; bÞ, for s 2 S, CP6sða; bÞ, CPrða; bÞ, for s 2 Sn{1}, r 2 Q[0, 1]n{1} :CP61ða; bÞ, and
:CP1ða; bÞ do not hold – and the whole conjunction is not satisﬁable,(2) the probability of b is greater than zero.
As a consequence, to prove decidability of our logic it is enough to prove decidability of satisﬁability of
formulas which are conjunctions of conditional probabilistic formulas of the forms: 
CPPsða; bÞ, ±CP6s(a,b),
and ±CPr(a,b), such that the probability of b is greater than 0.
In the next step, we will reduce the satisﬁability problem to linear programming problem. Note that the
same approach is used to prove decidability in papers [9,27,25] that deal with the standard real-valued prob-
abilities. However, in the logic we discuss here, the range of probabilities is recursive and contains non-stan-
dard values, and there are operators of the form CPr that do not appear in the mentioned papers. Thus, we
should perform the reduction carefully to obtain linear systems that are suitable for establishing decidability,
which, in our approach, means that Fourier–Motzkin elimination can be applied to them. The idea is to elim-
inate  and 6 signs and to try to solve linear systems in an extension of Q[]. We will use the following
abbreviations:
• xi denotes the measure of the atom ai 2 At(A), i = 1, . . . , 2n,
• ai  a means that the atom ai appears in the complete disjunctive normal form of a classical propositional
formula a,
•
PðaÞ denotes Pai2AtðAÞ:aiaxi, and
• C
Pða; bÞ denotes
P
ða^bÞP
ðbÞ .
Recall that [a]M denotes the set of all worlds of an LPP
S
Meas;Neat-model M that satisfy a. Since
½aM ¼ [ai2AtðAÞ:aia½aiM , and diﬀerent atoms are mutually exclusive, i.e., [ai]M \ [aj]M = ; for i5 j, CPPs(a,b)
holds in M iﬀ
PðbÞ ¼ 0, or PðbÞ > 0 and CPða; bÞP s (and similarly for CP6s, and CPr).
Let us consider a formula A of the form:ð^i¼1;I 
 CPPsiðai; biÞÞ ^ ð^j¼1;J 
 CP6sjðaj; bjÞÞ ^ ð^l¼1;L 
 CPrlðal; blÞÞ:Then, A is satisﬁable iﬀ the following system is satisﬁable:P2n
i¼1
xi ¼ 1;
xi P 0 for i ¼ 1; 2n;PðbÞ > 0 for every formula b appearing in the formulas of the
form 
 CP}ða; bÞ from A; and } 2 fP si;6 sj; rlg;
C
Pðai; biÞP si for every formula CPPsiðai; biÞ from A;
C
Pðai; biÞ < si for every formula :CPPsiðai; biÞ from A;
C
Pðaj; bjÞ 6 sj for every formula CP6sjðaj; bjÞ from A;
C
Pðaj; bjÞ > sj for every formula :CP6sjðaj; bjÞ from A;
C
Pðal; blÞ  rl for every formula CPrlðal; blÞ from A;
C
Pðal; blÞ 6 rl for every formula :CPrlðal; blÞ from A:
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Pðal; blÞ  rl can
be seen asC
X
ðal; blÞ  rl  0 and C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl P 0 ð1Þ
or
C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl  0 and rl  C
X
ðal; blÞP 0: ð2Þ
Similarly, every expression of the form C
Pðal; blÞ 6 rl can be seen as
C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl 6 0 and C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl > 0 ð3Þ
or
C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl 6 0 and rl  C
X
ðal; blÞ > 0: ð4Þ
Thus, we will consider systems containing expressions of the forms (1)–(4) instead of C
Pðal; blÞ  rl, and
C
Pðal; blÞ 6 rl, respectively. Let us use Sð x!; Þ to denote a system of that form. Note thatC
X
ðal; blÞ  rl  0 and C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl P 0
is equivalent to ð9nl 2 NÞ 0 6 C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl < nl 	 ; ð5Þ
C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl  0 and rl  C
X
ðal; blÞP 0
is equivalent to ð9nl 2 NÞ 0P C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl > nl 	 ; ð6Þ
C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl 6 0 and C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl > 0
is equivalent to ð9nl 2 NÞC
X
ðal; blÞ  rl >
1
nl
; ð7Þ
C
X
ðal; blÞ  rl 6 0 and rl  C
X
ðal; blÞ > 0
is equivalent to ð9nl 2 NÞC
X
ðal; blÞ  rl < 
1
nl
: ð8ÞSince we have only ﬁnitely many expressions of the forms (1)–(4) in our system, we can use a unique n0 2 N
instead of many nl’s in expressions (5)–(8). We use Sð x!; n0; Þ to denote the obtained system. Then,Sð x!; Þ has a solution in Q½ if Sð x!; n0; Þ hasasolutionin Q½; ð9Þ
and, since Q[] is dense in *R, for every ﬁxed and ﬁnite n0,Sð x!; n0; Þ has a solution in Q½ iff Sð x!; n0; Þ has a solution in R: ð10Þ
Note that n0 is not determined in the (9) and (10) above. Now, we will replace n0 with another, inﬁnite but
ﬁxed, parameter K which will also have some suitable characteristics in relation to . The role of K is to help
us to avoid the standard approach to the analysis of inequalities, where we have very often to discuss argu-
ments of the form ‘‘it holds for all, large enough integers’’. Since K is a positive inﬁnite integer, if an inequality
holds for every n greater than some ﬁxed ﬁnite n0, by the overspill principle it also holds for K. The other direc-
tion is a consequence of the underspill principle which says that if an inequality holds for every inﬁnite number
less than K, it also holds for some ﬁnite positive integer. Thus, let us consider the following setO ¼ fn 2 N : Sð x!; n; Þ has a solution in Rg:
O is an internal set which contains all natural numbers greater than some ﬁxed natural number n 0. Using the
overspill and underspill principles, we conclude that, if Sð x!; Þ is solvable in Q[], then O also contains all inﬁ-
nite numbers from *N which are less than a ﬁxed inﬁnite natural number K, i.e., for some n 0 2 N, and
K 2 *NnN, [n 0,K] = {n 2 *N : n 0 6 n 6 K}  O. Then,Sð x!; n0; Þ has a solution in R iffSð x!;K; Þ has a solution in R: ð11Þ
We can choose K so that for every k 2 N, Kk Æ   0. That can be explained as follows. Let us consider the
internal set O0 ¼ fn 2 N : nn < 1ﬃ

p g. Obviously, N  O 0. Using the overspill principle, there is some K 2 *NnN
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
p , and 0 < KK 	  < ﬃﬃp . Thus, for every k 2 N, 0 < Kk 	  < ﬃﬃp , and Kk Æ   0. Note that
 and 6 do not appear in the system Sð x!;K; Þ. Thus, we can freely multiply (in)equalities by the denomi-
nators of the expressions of the form C
Pða; bÞ and in that way obtain linear (in)equalities of the form
X
ða ^ bÞ  s
X
ðbÞq0;where s is a rational function in  and K, and q 2 fP; >;¼; <;6g.
Now, we can perform Fourier–Motzkin elimination, which iteratively rewrites the starting system into a
new system without a variable xi such that two systems are equisatisﬁable. During the procedure, numerators
and denominators of coeﬃcients in (in)equalities remain polynomials in  and K. When no variables are left,
we have to check satisﬁability of relations between numerical expressions with parameters  and K which can
be done since: Q[] is recursive and ordered ﬁeld, and K is chosen so that for every k 2 N, Kk Æ   0. Namely,
we consider two polynomials Q1(,K) and Q2(,K) in  and K of the forms: Q1ð;KÞ ¼ q1;0Q1;0ðKÞ0þ
q1;1Q1;1ðKÞ1 þ 	 	 	 þ q1;n1Q1;n1ðKÞn1 , and Q2ð;KÞ ¼ q2;0Q2;0ðKÞ0 þ q2;1Q2;1ðKÞ1 þ 	 	 	 þ q2;n2Q2;n2ðKÞn2 , where
qi,j’s are rationals, and Qi,j(K)’s are polynomials in K with rational coeﬃcients. Comparison of polynomials
Q1(,K) and Q2(,K) starts by examining q1;0Q1;0ðKÞ and q2;0Q2;0ðKÞ in the standard way. If they are equal,
we have to examine q1;1Q1;1ðKÞ and q2;1Q2;1ðKÞ and so on. Since  is an inﬁnitesimal, the above examination
of expressions sharing the same powers of  is done in a reverse order with respect to the standard procedure
of comparison of polynomials.
It follows that the problem of solving whether Sð x!;K; Þ has a solution in *R is decidable. From the equal-
ities (9)–(11), it follows that the problem of solving whether Sð x!; Þ has a solution in Q[] is decidable, too.
If Sð x!; Þ is solvable, we can deﬁne an LPPS-model M ¼ hW ;H ; l; vi such that W = At(A), H = 2W, l is
deﬁned according to the solutions of Sð x!; Þ, and v satisﬁes v(a)(p) = > iﬀ p (and not :p) occurs in the atom
a. Obviously, M  A. However, even if Sð x!; Þ has a solution, some of xi’s might be 0. It means that M does
not satisfy the neatness condition, i.e., that some non-empty sets of worlds (represented by the corresponding
atoms that hold in those worlds) have the zero probabilities. In that case, we can simply remove those worlds
and denote the obtained model by M 0. It is easy to see that for every A 2 ForSP , M  A iﬀ M 0  A. Thus, we
have:
Theorem 10. The problem of LPPSMeas;Neat-satisfiability is decidable.
Example 11. Let us consider the formula A = C ^ ((D _ B)! (D ^ B)), where B, C and D denote CP0(q,>),
CP1ð:p ^ :q;:qÞ and CP0:4ðp ^ q; qÞ, respectively. The set of atoms, At(A), contains a1 = p ^ q,
a2 ¼ p ^ :q, a3 ¼ :p ^ q and a4 ¼ :p ^ :q. Let xi denote the measure of atom ai. The formula A is equivalent
to ðB ^ C ^ DÞ _ ð:B ^ C ^ :DÞ. We start with the ﬁrst conjunct B ^ C ^ D. According to the above proce-
dure suppose that the measures of q and :q are greater than zero, i.e., that x1 + x3 > 0, and x2 + x4 > 0.
B ^ C ^ D is satisﬁable iﬀ the same holds for the following system:x1 þ x2 þ x3 þ x4 ¼ 1; xi P 0 for i ¼ 1; 4;
x1 þ x3 > 0 x2 þ x4 > 0;
x1 þ x3  0;
x2=ðx2 þ x4Þ  1;
x1=ðx1 þ x3Þ  0:4;which is equivalent tox1 þ x2 þ x3 þ x4 ¼ 1; xi P 0 for i ¼ 1; 4;
x1 þ x3 > 0; x2 þ x4 > 0;
0 < x1 þ x3 < n1;
x4=ðx2 þ x4Þ < 1=n2;
0:4 n3 < x1=ðx1 þ x3Þ < 0:4þ n3
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Since  does not appear in the last system, Fourier–Motzkin elimination can be performed in the standard
way. The procedure ﬁnishes with the true condition1 No
symbo1 n
n
< 1;which means that the considered formula is satisﬁable.7. Modelling default reasoning
The central notion in the ﬁeld of default reasoning is the notion of default rules. A default rule, which can
be seen as a sentence of the form ‘if a, then generally b’, can be written as1 aY b. A default base D is a set of
default rules. Default reasoning is described in terms of the corresponding consequence relation , i.e., we are
interested in determining the set of defaults that are the consequences of a default base. Then, if a is a descrip-
tion of our knowledge and D aY b, we (plausibly) conclude that b is the case. There are a number of papers
which describe in terms of classes of models and the corresponding satisﬁability relations  such that
D aY b if for every model M satisfying D, M  aY b. In [17,18] a set of properties which form a core of
default reasoning, called the system P, and the corresponding deduction relation ‘P were proposed. Default
consequence relation was also described in terms of preferential models, and it was proved that the system P is
sound and complete with respect to the class of all such models:
Theorem 12 [17, Theorem 5.18]. D aY b with respect to the class of all preferential models if and only if
D‘PaY b.
The same holds for a special proper subclass of the class of preferential models, the so-called rational mod-
els, also considered in [18]. As it was pointed in [11], those two classes are not distinguishable using the lan-
guage of defaults. It turns out that many other approaches to default reasoning [1,3,4,14] are characterized by
P. It is explained in [11] that the classes of models of all those systems can be mapped into the so-called rich
classes of qualitative plausibility structures such that the following (weak) completeness theorem holds:
Theorem 13 [11, Theorem 5.8]. A set T of qualitative plausibility structures is rich if and only if for all finite
default base D and defaults aY b, D  TaY b implies D‘PaY b.
It was also argued that the ﬁniteness constraint for D can be overcome (which leads to the strong complete-
ness), but the proof was not given there.
In this section we describe how our system can be used to model default reasoning. The ideas of using prob-
abilities and inﬁnitesimals in default reasoning are not new (see, for example [1,4,14,18,31]). In [18] a family of
non-standard (*R) probabilistic models characterizing ‘P was proposed. An *R-probabilistic model is a triple
M ¼ hW ;H ; li, whereW is a set of possible worlds (truth assignments to propositional letters),H is an algebra
of subsets ofW containing all sets deﬁnable by propositional formulas, and l : H! R* is a ﬁnitely additive *R-
valued probability measure. A default aY b holds in an *R-probabilistic model if either the probability of a is 0
or the conditional probability of b given a is inﬁnitesimally close to 1. Obviously, that class of models is a super-
class of LPPSMeas;Neat since in our approach the range of probabilities is a countable subset of the unit interval of
*R.
We can use CP1(b,a) to syntactically represent the default aY b. In the sequel, we will use aY b both in
the original context of the system P and to denote the corresponding translation CP1(b,a). In the case of a
ﬁnite default base our approach produces the same result as the other mentioned approaches, namely it is
equivalent to P.
Theorem 14. For every finite default base D and for every default aY bD‘Pab iff D‘AxLPPS ab:te that the other authors use diﬀerent symbols (!, , for example) to denote the ‘default implication’. In the present setting those
ls may cause confusion, so we prefer to introduce a new symbol here.
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CP1ðc; aÞÞ ! CP1ðb ^ c; aÞ corresponds to And rule) of the system P are valid in the class of non-standard
probability models from [18], and LPPSMeas;Neat is a subclass of that class, P is sound with respect to LPP
S
Meas;Neat.
On the other hand, following the ideas from [18, Lemma 4.9], we can show that for every ﬁnite default base D
and for every default aY b, if D0Pab then D0AxLPPS ab. The key step in the proof is that there is a ﬁnite
rational model M which satisﬁes D and does not satisfy aY b. M can be transformed to an LPPSMeas;Neat-model
M 0 such that for every default d, M  d iﬀ M 0  d. The transformation can be as follows. For an arbitrary
inﬁnitesimal  0 2 S a probability distribution l on W can be deﬁned so that:
• lðwnþ1ÞlðwnÞ ¼ 0, where wn and wn+1 are the sets of all states of the rank n and n + 1 respectively, and
• all states of the same rank have equal probabilities.
Since M  D and M2ab, the same holds for M 0, and from the completeness of AxLPPS we obtain that
D0AxLPPS ab. h
Finally, as it is noted in [18, Theorem B.12], using the similar arguments as above we can also prove a stron-
ger version of Theorem 14:
Theorem 15. If only finitely many propositional letter occur in a default base D, then for every default aY b,
D‘PaY b if and only if D‘AxLPPS ab.
Theorem 15 cannot be generalized to an arbitrary default base D, as it is illustrated by the following exam-
ple. It is proved in [18, Lemma 2.7] that the inﬁnite set of defaults T ¼ fpipiþ1; piþ1:pig, where pi’s are
propositional letters for every integer iP 0, has only non-well-founded preferential models (a preferential
model containing an inﬁnite descending chain of states) in which p0 ?, i.e., p0 is consistent. It means that
T0P p0 ?. On the other hand, T‘AxLPPS p0 ? since the following holds. Let an LPPSMeas;Neat-model
M = hW,H,l,vi satisfy the set T. If l([pi]) = 0, for some i > 0, then it must be l([p0]) = 0, and M  p0Y ?.
Thus, suppose that l([pi])5 0, for every i > 0. Then, for every iP 0:
lð½pi^piþ1Þ
lð½piÞ  1 and
lð½:pi^piþ1Þ
lð½piþ1Þ  1, i.e.,
lð½pi^piþ1Þ
lð½piÞ ¼ 1 1 and
lð½:pi^piþ1Þ
lð½piþ1Þ ¼ 1 2, for some inﬁnitesimals 1 and 2. A simple calculation shows that
lð½piÞ ¼ 211 lð½piþ1Þ, which means that l([pi]) 6 0l([pi+1]) for some inﬁnitesimal 0. Since, for some c and
k, 0 6 ck, it follows that for every i > 0, 0 6 l([p0]) 6 i. Since l([p0]) 2 S and there is no positive element
of S with such property, it follows thatlð½p0Þ ¼ 0; ½p0 ¼ ; and M  p0 ? :
Since M is an arbitrary LPPSMeas;Neat-model, T‘AxLPPS p0 ?. Note that the above proof of l([p0]) = 0, does not
hold in the case when the range of the probability is the unit interval of *R because *R is x1-saturated (which
means that the intersection of any countable decreasing sequence of non-empty internal sets must be non-
empty). As a consequence, thanks to the restricted ranges of probabilities that are allowed in LPPSMeas;Neat-class
of models, our system goes beyond the system P, when we consider inﬁnite default bases.
There are some weaknesses of P. The most notable are that it suﬀers from the problems of irrelevance and
inheritance blocking from classes to exceptional subclasses [4,14]. To overcome these problems the following
approach is usually taken: considering a default base, one determines a subset of the corresponding class of
models and reasons about the behavior of defaults in that subclass only. For example, the system Z [14] is
based on the class which contains only one model of the considered default base. That model is distinguished
because the corresponding ranking function is minimal. In Z the irrelevance problem is correctly addressed.
Similarly, the system Z* from [14] solves the drawback of the inheritance blocking. Since ranking functions
that are used in those systems are qualitative approximations of non-standard probabilities, it is not hard to
see, having in mind the procedure for the probability calculation mentioned in the proof of Theorem 14, that
those systems can be described in the semantical framework given by our approach. In other words, when we
consider a base D, and the induced ranking kz (k+), it is possible to transform the model which corresponds
to the ranking into an LPPSMeas;Neat-model M. Then, M can be used to semantically model z-entailment (z
+-
entailment).
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express formulas that represents defaults but also to describe more: probabilities of formulas, negations of
defaults, combinations of defaults with the other (probabilistic) formulas etc. Let us now consider some sit-
uations where these possibilities allow us to obtain more conclusions than in the framework of the language
of defaults.
For example, the translation of rational monotonicity, ððabÞ ^ :ða:cÞÞ ! ðða ^ cÞbÞ, is LPPSMeas;Neat-
valid since rational monotonicity is satisﬁed in every *R-probabilistic model, and LPPSMeas;Neat is a subclass of
that class of models. The same holds for the formula :ðtruefalseÞ corresponding to another property called
normality in [11]. Note that in the above examples we use negated defaults that are not expressible in P. Next,
let the default base consist of the following two defaults sY b and sY t, where s, b and tmeans Swedes, blond
and tall, respectively [4]. Because of the inheritance blocking problem, in some systems (for example in P) it is
not possible to conclude that Swedes who are not tall are blond (ðs ^ :tÞb). Since our system and P coincide
if the default base is ﬁnite, the same holds in our framework. In fact, there are some LPPSMeas;Neat-models in
which the previous formula is not satisﬁed. Avoiding a discussion of intuitive acceptability of the above con-
clusion, we point out that by adding some additional assumptions to the default base we can entail that con-
clusion too. For example, let these assumptions be CP=1(t, s) and CP¼12ðb; sÞ. First, note that they are
compatible with defaults sY t and sY b. Then, an easy calculation shows that P ðs^:tÞPðsÞ ¼ P ðsÞPðs^tÞPðsÞ ¼
PðsÞPðsÞþPðsÞ
PðsÞ ¼ , and similarly P ðs^:bÞP ðsÞ ¼ 2. Finally, we can estimate the conditional probability of b given
s ^ :t:P ðs ^ :t ^ bÞ
Pðs ^ :tÞ ¼
P ðs ^ :tÞ  P ðs ^ :t ^ :bÞ
P ðs ^ :tÞ P
P ðsÞ  2P ðsÞ
PðsÞ ¼ 1 :It follows that ðs ^ :tÞb.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the proof-theoretical analysis of a probabilistic logic which allows
making statements about (approximate) conditional probabilities. The corresponding semantics consists of
Kripke models with a ﬁnitely additive probability measure deﬁned on sets of worlds such that the range of
probabilistic functions is the unit interval of a recursive non-archimedean ﬁeld. Thanks to such an
approach it is possible to discuss ‘‘conditioning on the events of zero probability’’ and to model default
reasoning.
Using inﬁnitesimals in such a framework is not a complete novelty. For example, it was used in [10] to over-
come diﬃculties concerning conditional probability when dealing with zero probabilities. In [1] a probabilistic
interpretation for default rules was suggested, while in [18] *R-valued probabilities were used to model
defaults. A logic of gambles which can reason with inﬁnitesimal probabilities was given in [33]. Inﬁnitesimal
belief functions were considered in [4].
The novelty in our approach is that in addition to model theory we provide also a proof-theory, i.e., a
strongly complete and decidable axiomatic system.
There are a few papers discussing this type of probability logic from the proof-theoretical point of view
[9,21,33]. In [9] conditional probability was deﬁned syntactically. However, the machinery of real closed ﬁelds
was needed to obtain the corresponding axiomatization, while only the weak completeness was proved. The
later holds also for the fuzzy modal logic from [21], where for each pair of formulas a and b, the probability of
the conditional event ‘‘a given b’’ is taken as the truth-value of the (fuzzy) modal proposition P(ajb). It would
be interesting to correlate our approach and an extension of the logic from [33] with ideas presented in [12].
Conditional probabilities were combined with default reasoning, for example in [1,13,14,19,20]. The corre-
sponding approaches were model-theoretic, and comparing those logics with ours would be also a challenge.
The system from [13] can also deal with ‘‘conditioning on the events of zero probability’’ since it is based on de
Finetti’s coherence principle. Some of the other directions for further work are: ﬁnding precise complexity of
the satisﬁability problem in our logic, extending the presented result to the ﬁrst order languages. The later
could be done along the ideas from [25].
66 M. Rasˇkovic´ et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 52–66Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for very useful comments which corrected
some mistakes and helped improve the text. Some results in this paper appeared in preliminary form in [28,29].
References
[1] E.W. Adams, The logic of Conditional, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975.
[2] N. Alechina, Logic with probabilistic operators, in: Proceedings of the ACCOLADE’94, 1995, pp. 121–138.
[3] S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade, Nonmonotonic reasoning, conditional objects and possibility theory, Artiﬁcial Intelligence (92)
(1997) 259–276.
[4] S. Benferhat, A. Saﬃotti, P. Smets, Belief functions and default reasoning, Artiﬁcial Intelligence (122) (2000) 1–69.
[5] V. Biazzo, A. Gilio, T. Lukasiewicz, G. Sanﬁlippo, Probabilistic logic under coherence, model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and
default reasoning in System P, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 12 (2) (2002) 189–213.
[6] V. Biazzo, A. Gilio, T. Lukasiewicz, G. Sanﬁlippo, Probabilistic logic under coherence: complexity and algorithms, Annals of
Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence 45 (1–2) (2005) 35–81.
[7] R. -Dordevic´, M. Rasˇkovic´, Z. Ognjanovic´, Completeness theorem for propositional probabilistic models whose measures have only
ﬁnite ranges, Archive for Mathematical Logic 43 (2004) 557–563.
[8] R. Fagin, J. Halpern, Reasoning about knowledge and probability, Journal of the ACM 41 (2) (1994) 340–367.
[9] R. Fagin, J. Halpern, N. Megiddo, A logic for reasoning about probabilities, Information and Computation 87 (1–2) (1990)
78–128.
[10] T. Flaminio, F. Montagna, A logical and algebraic treatment of conditional probability, in: L.A. Zadeh, (Ed.), Proceedings of
IPMU’04, 2004, pp. 493–500.
[11] N. Friedman, J. Halpern, Plausibility measures and default reasoning, Journal of the ACM 48 (6) (2001) 648–685.
[12] P.R. Gillett, R.B. Scherl, G. Shafer, A probabilistic logic based on the acceptability of gambles, International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning 44 (3) (2007) 281–300.
[13] A. Gilio, Probabilistic reasoning under coherence in System P, Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence 34 (2002) 5–34.
[14] M. Goldszmidt, J. Pearl, Qualitative probabilities for default reasoning, belief revision and causal modeling, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 84
(1996) 57–112.
[15] D.N. Hoover, Probability logic, Annals of Mathematical Logic 14 (1978) 287–313.
[16] J. Keisler, Elementary calculus, An Inﬁnitesimal Approach, second ed., Prindle, Weber & Schmidt, Boston, MA, 1986.
[17] S. Kraus, D. Lehmann, M. Magidor, Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 44
(1990) 167–207.
[18] D. Lehmann, M. Magidor, What does a conditional knowledge base entail? Artiﬁcial Intelligence 55 (1992) 1–60.
[19] T. Lukasiewicz, Probabilistic default reasoning with conditional constraints, Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence 34
(2002) 35–88.
[20] T. Lukasiewicz, Nonmonotonic probabilistic logics under variable-strength inheritance with overriding: complexity, algorithms, and
implementation, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 44 (3) (2007) 301–321.
[21] E. Marchioni, L. Godo, A logic for reasoning about coherent conditional probability: a modal fuzzy logic approach, in: Proceedings
of the JELIA’04, Lecture notes in artiﬁcial intelligence, vol. 3229, Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 213–225.
[22] Z. Markovic´, Z. Ognjanovic´, M. Rasˇkovic´, A probabilistic extension of intuitionistic logic, Mathematical Logic Quarterly 49 (2003)
415–424.
[23] N. Nilsson, Probabilistic Logic Artiﬁcial Intelligence 28 (1986) 71–87.
[24] Z. Ognjanovic´, M. Rasˇkovic´, Some probability logics with new types of probability operators, Journal of Logic and Computation 9
(2) (1999) 181–195.
[25] Z. Ognjanovic´, M. Rasˇkovic´, Some ﬁrst-order probability logics, Theoretical Computer Science 247 (1–2) (2000) 191–212.
[26] Z. Ognjanovic´, T. Timotijevic´, A. Stanojevic´, Database of papers about probability logics, Mathematical Institute Belgrade. <http://
problog.mi.sanu.ac.yu/> 2005.
[27] M. Rasˇkovic´, Classical logic with some probability operators, Publications de l’Institut Mathe´matique, Nouvelle Se´rie, Beograd 53
(67) (1993) 1–3.
[28] M. Rasˇkovic´, Z. Ognjanovic´, Z. Markovic´, A probabilistic approach to default reasoning, in: Proceedings of the NMR’04, 2004, pp.
335–341.
[29] M. Rasˇkovic´, Z. Ognjanovic´, Z. Markovic´, A logic with conditional probabilities, in: Proceedings of the JELIA’04, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 3229, Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 226–238.
[30] A. Robinson, Non-standard Analysis, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1966.
[31] K. Satoh, A probabilistic interpretation for lazy nonmonotonic reasoning, Proceedings of the 8th American Conference on Artiﬁcial
Intelligence (1990) 659–664.
[32] W. van der Hoeck, Some consideration on the logics PFD, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 7 (3) (1997) 287–307.
[33] N. Wilson, A logic of extended probability, in: First International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and their Applications,
1999, Ghent, Belgium.
